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This research investigated the relationship between the need for cognitive closure 
(NFC) and preference for generalized (over specialized) epistemic authorities. Seven 
studies tested the hypotheses that: individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in 
NFC (1) evaluate generalized epistemic authorities more positively relative to 
specialized epistemic authorities, (2) report relying on generalized epistemic 
authorities more heavily relative to specialized epistemic authorities, and have 
epistemic authority sets that (3) are smaller and (4) consist of more generalized 
epistemic authorities; and individuals in whom NFC is situationally heightened (vs. 
lowered) (5) evaluate generalized epistemic authorities more positively relative to 
specialized epistemic authorities, (6) report a greater readiness to rely on more 
generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities, and (7) report liking and relying 
more heavily on epistemic authorities framed as multifinal (vs. unifinal) means. 
Whereas the first six hypotheses outlined above concern the nature of the relationship 
  
between NFC and epistemic authority preferences, the seventh concerns the proposed 
mechanism, means multifinality, through which this link is established. The findings 
were mixed. Participants dispositionally higher in NFC did have epistemic authority 
sets consisting of more generalized epistemic authorities (Pilot Study A) and 
exhibited greater implicit liking of generalized epistemic authorities relative to 
specialized epistemic authorities (Study 1); however, the latter result was not obtained 
with explicit, self-report measures of liking (Studies 1, 2a,b, and 4). Moreover, 
unexpected results were obtained regarding NFC’s relation to reliance on generalized 
(vs. specialized) epistemic authorities, with individuals higher in NFC, both 
dispositionally and situationally, exhibiting greater reliance on specialized (vs. 
generalized) epistemic authorities (Studies 1, 3, and 4). Experimental evidence from 
Study 4 suggests the means multifinality mechanism proposed to link NFC and 
epistemic authority generalization preferences is, in fact, in play, at least with respect 
to epistemic authority reliance; however, it appears to operate in a fashion opposite 
that predicted by the original theory. Finally, as predicted, NFC was inversely related 
to epistemic authority set size (Study 3 and Pilot Study B). A revised theory is 
presented to account for these findings, implications of the present research are 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In September of 2008, with the race for the presidency of the United States in 
full swing, the CBS Evening News conducted a series of interviews with Republican 
nominee John McCain’s vice presidential running mate, Alaska governor Sarah Palin. 
Aired in multiple installments over a two-week period, the interviews garnered 
tremendous national attention, with a number of Palin’s responses lambasted by 
political pundits and replayed ad infinitum by the media. One such heavily 
scrutinized segment was the following exchange between Palin and CBS anchor 
Katie Couric, in which Palin appeared unable to name a single print news source she 
consulted on regular basis: 
Couric: And when it comes to establishing your worldview, I was curious, 
what newspapers and magazines did you regularly read before you were 
tapped for [the nomination] to stay informed and to understand the world? 
Palin: I read most of them, again with a great appreciation for the press, for 
the media… 
Couric: But, like, what one specifically, I’m curious, that you… 
Palin: All of them. Any of them that have been in front of me over all these 
years. 
Couric: Can you name a few? 
Palin: I have a vast variety of sources where we get our news. Alaska isn't a 
foreign country, where it's kind of suggested, "Wow, how could you keep in touch 
with what the rest of Washington, D.C., may be thinking when you live up there in 




The cumulative fallout of the Couric interviews appeared to deal the 
McCain/Palin ticket a heavy blow, with one White House correspondent noting that 
“Palin's two weeks of interview broadcasts on the CBS Evening News coincided with 
a collapse in her approval ratings and a loss of McCain's gains among white women” 
(Schrerer, 2008). Most pertinent to the present research, however, is the response – of 
the general public and media elites, alike – to Palin's newspaper gaffe, which suggests 
people care a great deal about where major public figures glean their knowledge and 
information from, and how numerous and diverse these sources are. But why should 
we care so much? Couric may have already answered this when she stated the sources 
we turn to for knowledge – i.e., our epistemic authorities (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 
2005) – shape how we see the world, thus forming our worldview. If an individual's 
collection of epistemic authorities – i.e., his or her epistemic authority set – is, in fact, 
a crucial determinant of how he or she views the world, it is clearly a phenomenon 
worthy of study. 
Epistemic authority sets are not only important for understanding the behavior 
of political elites, such as Palin. Where prominent political figures obtain their 
information from is clearly of significance, as it can influence what causes they 
champion, which policies they push, and whose needs go neglected. However, the 
epistemic authority sets of average citizens are also of considerable import, as they 
influence critical elements of the democratic process such as voting and public 
opinion. Moreover, although applying the epistemic authority concept to politics is 
useful for illustrating its “real-world” significance, individuals rely upon epistemic 




domain. Thus, the aim of the present research here was to investigate how epistemic 
authority preferences and sets – particularly, the size of these sets and the breadth of 
authority ascribed to members of these sets – are shaped at a general level not 
restricted to a specific sphere, such as politics. Toward this end, this research centers 
on the theoretical integration of three bodies of work in social cognition – (1) 
epistemic authority, and particularly its generalization, (2) means multifinality, and 








Chapter 2: Review of the Literature and Overview of the 
Present Theory 
The Need for Closure 
The need for closure (NFC) describes a preference for a quick, definitive 
decision or judgment to the alternative of continued uncertainty and ambiguity 
(Kruglanski, 1989). Two tendencies are believed to work in tandem to satisfy an 
individual’s need for closure: (1) seizing, or reaching closure on a given judgment or 
decision quickly, i.e., the urgency tendency, and (2) freezing, or holding on to the 
judgment reached so that closure is maintained, i.e., the permanence tendency 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).  
There exist stable individual differences in the motivation toward closure 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). However, situational factors can also exert influence 
upon a person’s felt need for closure at any given moment. Specifically, NFC can be 
heightened via factors that increase the cost of lack of closure on a particular decision 
task – e.g., ambient noise (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), time pressure 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), the promise of a more enjoyable subsequent task 
(Webster, 1993), and mental fatigue (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996) – and 
lowered via factors that increase the cost of premature closure – e.g., increased 
accountability (De Dreu & Koole, 1997, as cited in De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 
1999) and heightened fear of invalidity (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987). A 
substantive body of empirical work has demonstrated the consistent convergence of 
state and trait operationalizations of NFC (for reviews, see Kruglanski, 2004; 




In line with previous work on the need for closure, the present research 
operationalized NFC as both a stable trait variable and transient state variable. 
Because the heart of this research lies with the implications of individual differences 
in NFC for the structure of epistemic authority sets, which is presumably fairly stable, 
the trait operationalization was emphasized both conceptually and methodologically. 
However, NFC was also manipulated in order to provide evidence for the 
hypothesized causal mechanism underlying its relation to epistemic authority 
preferences. 
Nearly three decades of empirical work has implicated NFC in a multitude of 
social psychological phenomena, ranging from primacy effects (Webster, Richter, & 
Kruglanski, 1996) and the fundamental attribution error (Webster, 1993); to 
stereotype reliance (Dijksterhuis, Van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; 
Kruglanski & Freund, 1983); to personality variables such as right-wing 
authoritarianism (Roets & Van Hiel, 2006), political conservatism (Kossowska & van 
Hiel, 2003), and dogmatism (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); to groups phenomena 
such as the rejection of opinion deviates (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991) and the 
emergence of autocratic leadership styles (Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, & 
Kruglanski, 2003). Two findings particularly pertinent to the present research, 
however, concern the relationship between NFC and (1) an attenuated search for 
information when faced with a decision-making task (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987; 
Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996), and (2) a preference for multifinal means, i.e. 
means that serve multiple goals as opposed to just one (Chun & Kruglanski, 2005a). 




at hand, however, I will first provide overviews of the existent literatures on means 
multifinality and generalized epistemic authority. 
Means Multifinality 
Empirical and theoretical work on means multifinality is subsumed under the 
larger body of work born of goal systems theory (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2002), which 
adopts a cognitive approach to the study of motivational constructs such as goals – 
defined as “subjectively desirable states of affairs that the individual intends to attain 
through action” (Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009, p. 26) – and means to these goals. 
Central to this theoretical perspective is the thesis that goals and means are 
knowledge structures and, as such, are governed by cognitive principles such as 
activation, accessibility, and strength of association (Kruglanski et al., 2002). This 
cognitive approach to the study of motivation has produced a wealth of empirical 
findings elucidating the operation of motivational systems, including work on: goal 
progress inferences and their consequences (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Orehek, 2006); 
the use of affect as information in goal pursuit (Orehek, Bessarabova, Chen, & 
Kruglanski, 2011); the bi-directional (i.e., both bottom-up and top-down) nature of 
spreading activation in goal systems (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003); the transfer of 
motivational properties, such as degree of commitment and quality of affect, from 
goals to means (Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 2004); and nonconscious/implicit goal 
pursuit (e.g., Chun & Kruglanski, 2005b; Chun, Kruglanski, Sleeth-Keppler, & 
Friedman, 2012; Shah, 2003; for a review, see Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009).  
Particularly relevant to the research at hand, however, is empirical and 




multifinality. In contrast to unifinal means, which serve only one goal, multifinal 
means are means that can be employed in the service of multiple goals (Kruglanski et 
al., 2002). For example, a standard pen might be considered a unifinal means, as it 
(most likely) serves only the goal of writing, whereas a laser pen could be considered 
a multifinal means, as it can be used as both a writing instrument and a laser pointer 
(Zhang, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2007).  
Although the foregoing example might suggest otherwise, the multifinality (or 
lack thereof) of a means is not an inherent property of the means itself; rather, it is 
determined by the person employing it. Almost any means can be unifinal or 
multifinal, depending on the individual who adopts it and the goal(s) he or she holds. 
Take, for example, the social networking site Facebook. Whereas one person might 
use it solely as a (unifinal) means for keeping track of major events in the lives of his 
family members and good friends, another might employ it for this purpose, and also 
as a (multifinal) means for keeping tabs on acquaintances, commenting on news 
stories of interest, and perhaps even playing games.  
Research on means multifinality has investigated a number of phenomena 
associated with the size of multifinality sets; that is, the number of goals linked to a 
single means. For one, multifinal means are more likely to be chosen when the 
multiple goals the means serves are activated (Kruglanski et al., 2002). In this same 
vein, Kopetz, Faber, Fishbach, and Kruglanski (2011) identified what they termed the 
multifinality constraints effect, wherein the collection of means deemed acceptable, or 
means set, is winnowed to include only multifinal means when multiple goals are 




multifinality concerns are capable of operating outside of awareness when one or 
more implicit background goals are activated in addition to an explicit focal goal. 
In the case of multifinality set size, however, bigger is not necessarily better; 
means multifinality does appear to come at a cost. Associative strength among goal-
systemic elements is closely tied to means uni- or multi-finality, such that the larger a 
means’ multifinality set, the weaker the associative strength between the means and 
each goal and, consequently, the greater the reduction, or dilution, of the means’ 
perceived instrumentality to those goals (Zhang et al., 2007). Thus, there is an 
inherent tradeoff between the number of goals a means serves and the perceived 
likelihood that the means will lead to the successful attainment of any one of those 
goals. In other words, means multifinality has a “price” (Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009).  
However, just like the multifinality of a given means, the cost of multifinality 
need not be the same for everyone; individuals’ calculus may differ. For example, 
Kruglanski and his colleagues (2002) have posited that the expectancy of goal 
attainment, which derives from means instrumentality, may be especially important to 
individuals high in the locomotion orientation – i.e., individuals who strongly desire 
progress and movement. This line of reasoning suggests that choices made by high 
(vs. low) locomotors may be more heavily influenced by the reduction in perceived 
instrumentality that accompanies means multifinality. In addition, work by Chun and 
Kruglanski (2005a) has found that high (vs. low) need for closure individuals exhibit 
a stronger preference for multifinal means, suggesting that, compared to their low 
NFC counterparts, high NFC individuals weight multifinality set size considerations 




finding is highly relevant to the present research and will be discussed in greater 
detail shortly. For now, however, I will conclude my review of the existing literature 
by turning to the third and final body of pertinent research, that concerning epistemic 
authorities and, more specifically, their generalization/specialization. 
Generalized versus Specialized Epistemic Authorities 
As previously mentioned, an epistemic authority is any source an individual 
turns to for knowledge and/or guidance (Kruglanski et al., 2005). Because the 
ascription of epistemic authority is idiosyncratic, epistemic authorities can be anyone 
or anything seen as capable of disseminating information, or knowledge, with likely 
candidates for elevation to epistemic authority status including parents, friends, peers 
and colleagues, teachers, newspapers, magazines, and public figures. 
But all epistemic authorities are not created equal. To any particular source, an 
individual may ascribe a great deal of epistemic authority, none at all, or any amount 
in between. Furthermore, independent of the amount of epistemic authority attached 
to any given source, the breadth of the ascribed epistemic authority can fall at any 
point along a bipolar continuum ranging from highly generalized to highly 
specialized (Kruglanski et al., 2005).  
Generalized epistemic authorities are epistemic sources that individuals turn 
to for guidance in many or all areas, or domains, of life. For example, a highly 
religious individual might use a religious text, such as the Bible, to dictate how she 
should act in virtually all areas of her life; for this individual, then, the Bible would 
constitute a highly generalized epistemic authority. Specialized epistemic authorities, 




few area(s) of their lives. For instance, an automotive mechanic would constitute a 
specialized epistemic authority if an individual turned to him for information only in 
the knowledge domain of automotive matters. 
Although some epistemic authorities would appear to lend themselves more 
naturally to either generalization (e.g., the Bible) or specialization (e.g., a car 
mechanic), the degree to which ascribed epistemic authority is generalized or 
specialized ultimately depends – as with means multifinality – on the person doing 
the ascribing. For example, it is perhaps unlikely but not inconceivable that an 
individual would have a great deal of admiration for his car mechanic not confined to 
the realm of automobiles and, therefore, might consult his mechanic for guidance on 
numerous matters unrelated to cars. Similarly, an individual who is religious, but not 
highly so, might limit her epistemic reliance on the Bible to the question of how to 
treat the poor, thus adopting the position that one should donate generously to charity. 
The Need for Closure, Means Multifinality, and Preference for 
Generalized Epistemic Authorities: A Theoretical Synthesis 
The integration of the theoretical and empirical work on the three topics just 
reviewed – epistemic authority, the need for closure, and means multifinality – 
suggests fertile yet heretofore uncharted research terrain: namely, the investigation of 
need for closure’s relation to preference for generalized (over specialized) epistemic 
authorities.  
Central to such a theoretical synthesis is the proposition that a generalized 
epistemic authority constitutes a multifinal means to various (epistemic) ends. Recall 




et al., 2002). I propose that a generalized epistemic authority is such a means, as it – 
by definition – provides epistemic guidance in multiple areas of life. That is, 
generalized epistemic authorities provide epistemic closure in numerous knowledge 
domains, whereas specialized epistemic authorities provide epistemic closure in only 
the one or few specific domain(s) within which their authority is circumscribed. 
Moreover, the knowledge that one can turn to a single source to fulfill a variety of 
informational needs that may arise bestows a form of closure in-and-of itself. 
Therefore, individuals high in NFC should find generalized epistemic authorities 
especially attractive because they provide cross-situational consistency, in service of 
the permanence tendency that accompanies a heightened need for closure (Chun & 
Kruglanski, 2005a). 
In sum, then, two kinds of uncertainty arise when an individual realizes he or 
she is in need of additional information: (1) proximal uncertainty about the content of 
the unknown information itself (i.e., the what) and (2) distal uncertainty about the 
strategy for obtaining the desired information (i.e., the how). As multifinal means, 
generalized epistemic authorities should help reduce both types of uncertainty, which 
should be particularly appealing to individuals high in NFC, who find uncertainty 
(i.e., lack of closure) highly aversive (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Roets & van 
Hiel, 2008). 
The logic of my integrative theoretical argument, therefore, is as follows: If 
(a) individuals higher (vs. lower) in NFC exhibit a stronger preference for multifinal 
(vs. unifinal) means, as demonstrated by the work of Chun & Kruglanski (2005a), and 




should be implicated in the structuring of epistemic authority sets such that higher 
(vs. lower) NFC should predict a greater preference for and reliance on generalized 
epistemic authorities relative to specialized epistemic authorities. 
In the following section I introduce seven specific hypotheses derived from 
this broad theoretical argument along with supportive existing empirical findings, 
where applicable. 
Hypotheses and Supporting Existent Research 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
It is assumed that for individuals high in the need for closure, a lack of closure 
is highly aversive (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). This is supported by Roets and van 
Hiel’s (2008) finding that individuals high (vs. low) in NFC experience higher levels 
of distress, as assessed via both self-report and physiological measures (heart rate, 
blood pressure, and galvanic skin response), when faced with a decision task. 
Because high NFC individuals are presumably motivated to reduce this negative state 
by achieving closure on the decision task at hand, and generalized epistemic 
authorities are able to effect multiple forms of closure by reducing both the 
aforementioned what uncertainty (in numerous knowledge domains) and how 
uncertainty, I predict that individuals dispositionally and/or situationally high in NFC 
will prefer generalized epistemic authorities more than their low NFC counterparts. 
More specifically, I set forth the following five hypotheses for consideration. 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in NFC will 





Hypothesis 2: Individuals in whom NFC is situationally heightened (vs. 
lowered) will evaluate generalized epistemic authorities more positively relative to 
specialized epistemic authorities.  
Hypothesis 3: Individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in NFC will have 
epistemic authority sets consisting of more generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic 
authorities. 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in NFC will report 
relying more heavily on generalized epistemic authorities relative to specialized 
epistemic authorities. 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals in whom NFC is situationally heightened (vs. 
lowered) will report a greater readiness to rely on more generalized (vs. specialized) 
epistemic authorities. 
 Three areas of previous research lend support to these five foundational 
hypotheses of the present research. Particularly germane is work by Chun and 
Kruglanski (2005a) that suggests individuals high in NFC prefer multifinal means to a 
greater extent than their low NFC counterparts. Across five studies, Chun and 
Kruglanski found that individuals dispositionally high (vs. low) in NFC, as assessed 
via Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) 42-item Need for Closure Scale: (1) endorsed 
the “pro-multifinality” proverb of “killing two birds with one stone” to a greater 
extent than the “pro-unifinality” proverb “if you run after two hares, you will catch 
neither” (Study 1); (2) reported more multifinal use of computers (i.e., reported using 
computers to achieve a greater number of goals) (Study 2); (3) were more willing to 




(4) were willing to pay a higher price for their multifinality pursuit (Study 4); and (5) 
were more likely to select a multifinal means (soap) over multiple unifinal means 
(soap and facial cleanser) that, together, served the same goals (washing one’s face 
and body) as the multifinal means (Study 5). These findings, taken together with the 
conceptualization of generalized epistemic authorities as multifinal means I 
previously introduced, lend support to my first five hypotheses. 
Although, in Chun and Kruglanski’s studies the means were all material (e.g., 
soap, computers) as opposed to social (i.e., people) in nature, epistemic authorities are 
very often people, such as parents, idols, friends, and, in the case of self-ascribed 
epistemic authority, the self. A social conceptualization of means is not 
unprecedented, however. Sleeth-Keppler (2004) extended Chun and Kruglanski's 
(2005a) work to the social realm in his investigation of NFC’s relation to multifinal 
(vs. unifinal) conceptualizations of friendship. According to Sleeth-Keppler, for an 
individual subscribing to a unifinal, or “goal-specialist,” view of friendship, a person 
need only fulfill a single goal or objective in order to qualify as a “friend.” Such an 
individual might, for example, have a “running” friend, a “theater” friend, and so on. 
For someone subscribing to a multifinal view of friendship, however, an acquaintance 
would need to serve multiple functions (e.g., be a running buddy and a culture 
aficionado and a source of emotional support) in order to be considered a friend. 
Paralleling Chun and Kruglanski’s (2005a) findings, Sleeth-Keppler found that across 
both German and US samples, individuals dispositionally higher in NFC subscribed 




Work by Kruglanski, Pierro, and Sheveland (2011) has also conceptualized 
people as means. In their investigation of the association between equifinality set size 
(i.e., the number of means that all serve the same goal) and commitment to means and 
goals, Kruglanski et al.’s Study 2 operationalized means as social (i.e., people 
perceived to be instrumental to goal attainment). Conceptually replicating their 
findings in Study 1, which involved nonsocial means, equifinality set size was 
negatively correlated with commitment to each individual social means and positively 
correlated with perceived likelihood of goal attainment, goal importance, and goal 
commitment. In sum, then, the findings of both Sleeth-Keppler (2004) and Kruglanski 
et al. (2011) indicate that social means are functionally equivalent to nonsocial 
means, which suggests the previously demonstrated relationship between NFC and a 
preference for nonsocial multifinal means (Chun & Kruglanski, 2005a) should hold 
for both social and nonsocial epistemic authorities. 
A final piece of evidence that lends support specifically to Hypothesis 3 
comes from research by Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, and Abin (1993) on Israeli students’ 
perceptions of politicians and professors as epistemic authorities. Raviv and his 
colleagues found that politically conservative students viewed their political leaders 
as more generalized epistemic authorities than their liberal counterparts. Although not 
the focal finding of their work, this result is noteworthy for the purposes of the 
research being proposed here. Given that political conservatism is positively 
correlated with NFC (Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003), my theoretical framework 
suggests this finding might be of a common-causal, or “third variable,” nature – that 




generalized epistemic authorities. In other words, it might be that NFC is actually 
driving the observed relation between political conservatism and the perception of 
political leaders as generalized epistemic authorities. Although admittedly 
speculative, this interpretation is nonetheless plausible and congruent with the 
outlines of my theoretical argument. 
Hypothesis 6 
Because the crux of Hypotheses 1 through 5 rests with the conceptualization 
of generalized epistemic authorities as multifinal means, it seems crucial to test this 
multifinality mechanism directly via experimental manipulation. Therefore, my sixth 
hypothesis is that individuals in whom NFC is heightened (vs. lowered) will report 
greater liking of and reliance on epistemic authorities when they are framed as 
multifinal (i.e., generalized), as opposed to unifinal (i.e., specialized). 
Hypothesis 7  
My seventh and final hypothesis is that individuals higher (vs. lower) in NFC 
will have smaller epistemic authority sets. My rationale for this prediction is two-fold. 
First, individuals whose epistemic authorities tend to be more generalized 
(Hypothesis 3) should be able to satisfy their epistemic needs with fewer epistemic 
authorities, as a handful of epistemic authorities should be able to provide the level of 
epistemic guidance desired across all life domains. In contrast, an individual with an 
epistemic authority set comprised of highly specialized epistemic authorities would 
need to consult many different ones when seeking guidance across all of his or her 
life domains. In the same set of studies by Sleeth-Keppler (2004) discussed earlier, 




friendship but also had, on average, fewer friends, a finding very much in line with 
my Hypothesis 7. 
The second reason I expect higher (vs. lower) need for closure individuals to 
have smaller epistemic authority sets follows from previous research showing that 
individuals high in NFC seek out less information prior to making a decision 
(Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987; Webster et al., 1996). For instance, Webster et al. 
(1996) found that participants in a heightened state of need for closure due to mental 
fatigue requested fewer pages of information about a job candidate they were asked to 
make a hiring decision about. Similarly, Mayseless and Kruglanski (1987) 
investigated the relationship between the need for structure and the fear of invalidity 
– proxies for the need for closure and the need to avoid closure, respectively – and 
information seeking prior to rendering a judgment. Consistent with the finding of 
Webster and her colleagues, participants in the high need for structure (i.e., high need 
for closure) condition sought out significantly less information before furnishing their 
judgments than participants in the high fear of invalidity (i.e., high need to avoid 
closure) condition. Although Webster et al. (1996) and Mayseless and Kruglanski 
(1987) both manipulated the need for closure/structure, due to the consistent 
empirical convergence of NFC trait and state operationalizations (see Kruglanski, 
2004; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009) there is every reason to expect this association 
between NFC and a truncated information search also holds for NFC as a stable 
individual differences variable. Hence, because epistemic authorities are, by 
definition, regarded as sources of information, it follows that individuals higher in 




information and, therefore, have chronically smaller epistemic authority sets than low 
NFC individuals. 




Chapter 3: Overview of the Present Research 
To systematically test the foregoing seven hypotheses, seven studies, 
including two pilot studies and a conceptual replication, were carried out. Pilot 
Studies A and B, carried out in advance of Studies 1 through 4, served to provide 
preliminary support, or “proof of concept,” for the proposed theoretical framework. 
Specifically, they tested Hypothesis 3, that individuals dispositionally higher (vs. 
lower) in NFC have epistemic authority sets consisting of more generalized (vs. 
specialized) epistemic authorities, and Hypothesis 7, that individuals higher (vs. 
lower) in NFC have smaller epistemic authority sets. Studies 1 through 4 were 
designed to test the remaining five hypotheses. More specifically, Studies 1, and 2a,b 
tested the hypotheses that individuals dispositionally (Study 1) and situationally 
(Studies 2a,b) higher (vs. lower) in NFC evaluate generalized epistemic authorities 
more positively relative to specialized epistemic authorities (Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
respectively); Study 3 investigated whether individuals in whom NFC is situationally 
heightened (vs. lowered) report a greater readiness to rely on more generalized 
epistemic authorities (Hypothesis 5), and also provided a second opportunity to test 
Hypothesis 7, that NFC is inversely related to epistemic authority set size; and Study 
4 explored whether increasing the perceived generalization of participants’ epistemic 
authorities by way of a multifinality manipulation leads individuals in whom NFC is 
heightened (vs. lowered) to report greater liking of and reliance on their epistemic 
authorities (Hypothesis 6). Finally, data collected in both Studies 1 and 3 were also 




NFC will report relying more heavily on generalized epistemic authorities relative to 




Chapter 4: Pilot Study A 
Pilot Study A tested Hypothesis 3, that individuals dispositionally higher (vs. 
lower) in the need for closure have epistemic authority sets consisting of more 
generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities. 
Method 
Development of Materials 
Fifty-two University of Maryland undergraduate students (29 women, 23 men; 
mean age of 21.33 (SD = 2.83)) were approached by a female undergraduate research 
assistant in the Student Union and asked if they would be willing to participate in a 
short study. All participants volunteered to take part without being compensated. 
Individuals who agreed to participate were administered a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire in which they were asked to list (1) life domains they felt were 
personally relevant to them and (2) sources they turn to for knowledge and/or 
guidance (i.e., epistemic authorities) in the life domains they listed.  
Participants generated a total of 323 life domains, of which 150 were uniquely 
worded. Of all participant-generated responses, 83.0% (63.1% of uniquely worded 
responses) were able to be collapsed into the following eight categories: Family, 
Politics/Current Events, Romantic Relationships, School/Academics, 
Socializing/Social Relations, Sports/Exercise/Fitness, Work/Career, and Religion. 
Participants generated a total of 327 epistemic authorities, of which 157 were 
uniquely worded. The mean number of epistemic authorities generated by participants 
was 6.29 (SD = 3.23). Of all participant-generated responses, 86.7% (78.3% of 




categories: Parent(s), Friends/Peers, Internet, TV, Sibling(s), Professor(s)/Teacher(s), 
Extended Family, Boss/Supervisor, Newspaper(s), Significant Other, Academic 
Advisor, Coach(es), Religious Figure, Radio, Social Networking Site(s), Religious 
Text, and Co-workers. These eight life domains and seventeen epistemic authority 
categories were then incorporated into the materials for Pilot Study A, the procedure 
of which is described below. 
Participants  
Fifty-eight undergraduate students (33 women, 25 men) enrolled in a 
psychology course at the University of Maryland completed the study in exchange for 
extra course credit. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 24, with an average age of 
19.72 (SD = 1.45). Roughly half of the participants (53.4%) were Non-Hispanic 
White; other races/ethnicities represented in the sample were Asian (17.2%), 
Black/African-American (12.1%), Hispanic White (8.6%), Native American (5.2%), 
and Pacific Islander (1.7%). As there were no significant effects of gender, age, or 
race/ethnicity on the dependent variables of interest, they were not considered further.  
Design  
Pilot Study A employed a correlational design. 
Materials and Procedure  
The study was web-based. Participants first completed the 41-item Roets and 
van Hiel (2007) NFC scale (α = .87; see Appendix A), a modified version of the 
original Webster and Kruglanski (1994) NFC scale that possesses better psychometric 
properties than its predecessor. Sample items are “I think that having clear rules and 




unpredictable” (reverse-scored). Participants responded to all items on a 6-point 
Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree). 
 Next, participants were provided with the list of 17 epistemic authorities and 
asked to “please rate the extent to which you rely on each for guidance/knowledge, 
IN GENERAL” on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very much). Participants 
then repeated these ratings of the epistemic authorities for each of the eight life 
domains. Following this administration of the dependent measure, participants were 
asked if they had any guesses as to what the hypothesis of the study was and 
demographic information (age, gender, and race/ethnicity) was collected. 
Results 
Suspicion Check 
No participants guessed the study’s hypothesis. 
Generalization of Epistemic Authorities 
The degree of generalization of participants’ epistemic authorities was 
operationalized in two ways: (1) by averaging the “reliance, IN GENERAL” ratings 
given to all 17 epistemic authorities and (2) by generating a count of epistemic 
authorities given a “reliance, IN GENERAL” rating of 4 or higher (on the 5-point 
scale). Both variables were then regressed on NFC in separate simple linear 
regression analyses. 
 I expected that NFC would positively predict both measures of epistemic 
authority generalization. Both of these predictions were borne out by the data. NFC 
positively and significantly predicted mean reliance on generalized epistemic 




authorities given a reliance rating of 4 or higher, β = .34, t(56) = 2.68, p < .05. NFC 
was not a significant predictor of the mean reliance rating of epistemic authorities 
averaged across the eight specific life domains, β = .22, t(56) = 1.68, p > .05, nor was 
it a significant predictor of the number of epistemic authorities given a reliance rating 
of 4 or 5, averaged across the eight specific life domains, β = .05, t(56) = 0.38, p > 
.05. 
Discussion 
The findings of Pilot Study A provide empirical support for my third 
hypothesis. Individuals dispositionally higher in the need for closure do appear to 
have more generalized epistemic authorities, as assessed by both (a) the extent to 
which they report relying on each epistemic authority, in general, averaged across an 
individual’s complete epistemic authority set and (b) the total number of epistemic 
authorities an individual reported relying on heavily (i.e., rated 4 or 5 on a 5-point 
Likert scale), in general. Importantly, individuals higher in NFC did not report 
relying more heavily on their epistemic authorities in the eight specific life domains, 
which suggests the observed relationship between NFC and reliance on generalized 
epistemic authorities does not merely reflect an across-the-board tendency of high 
NFC individuals to rely more heavily on all types of epistemic authorities, regardless 






Chapter 5: Pilot Study B 
A second pilot study was carried out in order to test Hypothesis 7, that the 
need for closure is inversely related to epistemic authority set size.  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-three students (15 women, 8 men) enrolled in an undergraduate 
psychology course at the University of Maryland completed the study in exchange for 
extra course credit. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 26, with an average age of 
20.65 (SD = 1.85). As there were no significant effects of age or gender on the 
dependent variable of interest (epistemic authority set size), neither was considered 
further. 
Design 
Pilot Study B employed a correlational design. 
Materials and Procedure 
The study consisted of a short, web-based survey that asked participants to 
free-list sources they turn to for guidance/knowledge in their lives (i.e., their 
epistemic authorities). Participants’ responses were linked to their responses to a mass 
testing survey administered earlier in the semester, which included a short, 14-item 
version
1
 of Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) NFC scale (α = .82; see Appendix B). 
                                                 
1
 The short form of the Webster and Kruglanski (1994) scale was used due to logistical 
constraints, however, the Roets and van Hiel (2007) scale might have yielded better results 






Epistemic Authority Set Size 
The number of epistemic authorities listed by each participant was tallied. Per 
Hypothesis 7, I predicted NFC would be inversely related to the size of participants’ 
epistemic authority sets. A simple linear regression analysis revealed NFC to be a 
marginally significant negative predictor of epistemic authority set size, β = -.37, 
t(21) = -1.85, p < .10. 
Discussion 
 The result of Pilot Study B provides tentative empirical support for the 
hypothesis that individuals dispositionally high in the need for closure have smaller 
epistemic authority sets – that is, have fewer epistemic authorities – than their low 
NFC counterparts. Due to the only marginally significant p-value, however, an 
additional study (Study 3) was carried out that afforded a second test of Hypothesis 7. 
Study 3 also addressed the NFC measurement limitation of Pilot Study B by 
employing the 41-item Roets and van Hiel (2007) NFC scale, which is 
psychometrically superior to the 14-item short form of the Webster and Kruglanski 





Chapter 6: Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to test the hypotheses that individuals dispositionally 
higher (vs. lower) in the need for closure evaluate generalized epistemic authorities 
more positively (Hypothesis 1) and report relying on them more heavily (Hypothesis 
4), relative to specialized epistemic authorities. To increase methodological diversity, 




Eighty-eight students (61 women, 27 men) enrolled in an undergraduate 
psychology course at the University of Maryland completed the study in exchange for 
course credit. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 32, with an average age of 19.74 
(SD = 2.07). The majority of participants (67.0%) were Non-Hispanic White; other 
races/ethnicities represented in the sample were Black/African-American (19.3%), 
Asian (8.0%), Hispanic White (5.7%), and Native American (1.1%). There were no 
main effects of gender, age, or race/ethnicity on liking of generalized epistemic 
authorities, as assessed via self-report or the affect misattribution procedure (AMP). 
There was an unanticipated significant interaction between age (centered) and 
Hispanic White (effects coded) that predicted AMP liking of generalized epistemic 
authorities, β = .77, t(81) = 2.00, p < .05. There was also an unanticipated significant 
interaction between age (centered) and Black/African-American (effects coded) that 
predicted self-reported liking of generalized epistemic authorities, β = .36, t(63) = 




reasons both were controlled for in subsequent analyses. There were no other 
interactive effects among the demographic variables. 
Design  
Study 1 employed a correlational design. 
Materials and Procedure 
The study procedure consisted of two parts. Part 1 was administered as a web-
based survey and was used both to test Hypothesis 1 and to develop participant-
specific materials for Part 2, which took place in a lab setting. 
In Part 1, participants first completed the Roets and van Hiel (2007) NFC 
scale (α = .85; see Appendix A). Following this, participants were provided with 
definitions of both generalized and specialized epistemic authorities (see Appendix C) 
and asked to provide the name of two personal epistemic authorities they felt fit each 
definition – i.e., two generalized epistemic authorities and two specialized epistemic 
authorities. Next, participants were asked to indicate, on 6-point Likert scales (1 = 
Not at all, 6 = A great deal), both their liking of and reliance on the first epistemic 
authority of each type listed. The order in which participants were asked to provide 
examples and rate each type of epistemic authority was counterbalanced. Finally, 
participants’ guesses about the hypothesis of the study were solicited and 
demographic information (age, gender, and race/ethnicity) was collected. 
Participants who failed to provide specific epistemic authorities as instructed 
in Part 1 were emailed individually by a research assistant and asked to complete an 
abbreviated “redo” survey in which they were asked to again list two specialized 




completed the redo survey correctly were invited to participate in Part 2 of the study, 
which took place in a lab setting. Participants who either did not complete the redo 
survey or completed it but again failed to adequately follow the directions were not 
invited to take part in Part 2. 
The purpose of Part 2 was to measure participants’ liking of their personal 
epistemic authorities via the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, 
Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). The AMP is an implicit attitude measure that involves 
the presentation of an “affect-laden prime” – i.e., the stimulus of interest, the 
participant’s affective response toward which the procedure aims to evince – 
followed by the presentation of an ambiguous target that participants are asked to 
classify as either “pleasant” or “unpleasant.” The central assumption of the AMP is 
that participants’ implicit evaluations of the stimulus of interest (the prime) “bleed” 
over into their evaluations of the ambiguous targets. 
The AMP used in the present study was a modified version of that used in 
Payne et al.’s (2005) Study 1. First, participants were told they would be shown a 
series of Chinese pictographs that they would need to judge as either “pleasant” or 
“unpleasant” and were instructed to respond relatively quickly to each image. A 
single trial consisted of (a) the presentation of a prime in the center of the computer 
screen for 75 ms, followed by (b) a blank screen for 125 ms, followed by (c) the 
presentation of a Chinese pictograph for 100 ms, backward masked until the 
participant judged the target image as “pleasant”/“unpleasant.” Each participant 
completed 24 trials. In 12 of these trials, the prime was the name of a generalized 




generalized epistemic authorities presented 6 times. In the remaining 12 trials the 
prime was the name of a specialized epistemic authority the participant provided in 
Part 1, with each of the participant’s specialized epistemic authorities presented 6 
times. Both the order in which the primes were presented and their pairing with the 
Chinese pictographs were randomly determined for each participant. After 
completing the AMP in its entirety, participants were asked if they spoke Chinese and 
a funneled debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) was administered, marking the end 
of the study. 
Results 
Suspicion Check 
No participants guessed the hypothesis. Although some participants (n = 8) 
reported some level of suspicion that the AMP was a measure of liking, or positive 
affect, no participant drew a connection between this measure and epistemic authority 
type (generalized, specialized), or NFC. 
AMP Liking of Epistemic Authorities 
Two participants reported speaking Chinese and their AMP data was excluded 
from further analysis. For each of the remaining eighty-six participants, a difference 
score
2
 was computed by subtracting the number of AMP trials with a specialized 
epistemic authority serving as the prime judged as “pleasant” from the number of 
AMP trials with a generalized epistemic authority serving as the prime judged as 
                                                 
2
 Instead of treating the type of epistemic authority as a within-participants factor, difference 
scores were computed and used in the analyses for all three dependent variables of interest: 
AMP liking, self-reported liking, and self-reported reliance. This analysis approach was 
deemed appropriate given that the crux of the present theory rests on intra-individual 
comparisons of generalized and specialized epistemic authorities that presumably drive the 




“pleasant.” In a multiple regression analysis (see Table 1) with age (centered), 
Hispanic White (effects coded), and their interaction included as control variables, 
NFC significantly and positively predicted AMP difference score, β = .24, t(78) = 
2.17, p < .05. 







Age 1.077 .549 .746 .053 
Hispanic White 1.064 .697 .169 .131 
Age X Hispanic White .947 .551 .656 .090 





   .116 






Table 1. Evaluation of epistemic authorities as assessed via AMP difference score, regressed 
on NFC, Age, Hispanic White, and Age X Hispanic White (Study 1); 
*
 denotes p < .05 
 
Self-Reported Liking of Epistemic Authorities 
For each participant, a difference score was computed by subtracting self-
reported liking of the first specialized epistemic authority listed in Part 1 from self-
reported liking of the first generalized epistemic authority listed in Part 1. Participants 
who did not correctly follow instructions when listing their epistemic authorities were 
excluded from the analyses of the liking and reliance self-report data. The excluded 
participants (n = 19) did not significantly differ from the non-excluded participants (n 
= 69) in age (MExcluded = 19.50 (SD = 3.26), MIncluded = 19.81 (SD = 1.64), t(83) = 0.56, 
p > .05), NFC (MExcluded = 3.99 (SD = 0.39), MIncluded = 3.91 (SD = 0.49), t(86) = -
0.66, p > .05), or gender (χ
2
(1, N = 88) = .01, p > .05).  
The relationship between NFC and liking difference score was assessed via a 




American (effects coded), and the interaction between age and Black/African-
American were included as control variables. NFC did not significantly predict self-
reported liking difference score, β = .15, t(62) = 1.19, p > .05. 







Age .238 .142 .287 .100 
Black -.203 .200 -.062 .609 
Age X Black .300 .142    .362
*
 .039 
NFC .404 .339 .145 .237 
R
2 





Table 2. Evaluation of epistemic authorities as assessed via self-report, regressed on NFC, 
Age, Black, and Age X Black (Study 1); 
*
 denotes p < .05 
 
Self-Reported Reliance on Epistemic Authorities 
As with self-reported liking, a reliance difference score was computed for 
each participant by subtracting self-reported reliance on the first specialized epistemic 
authority listed in Part 1 from self-reported reliance on the first generalized epistemic 
authority listed in Part 1. Also as with the analysis of self-reported liking, participants 
who did not correctly follow instructions when listing their epistemic authorities in 
were excluded.  
A simple linear regression analysis revealed NFC to not be a significant 
predictor of reliance difference score, β = -.18, t(67) = -1.53, p > .05; it was, however, 
trending (p = .13) in a direction counter to that predicted by Hypothesis 4 (but 
consistent with the yet-to-be-discussed results of Studies 3 and 4). Moreover, NFC 
significantly and positively predicted self-reported reliance on the first specialized 




significant predictor of self-reported reliance on the first generalized epistemic 
authority participants listed, β = .04, t(67) = 0.29, p > .05. (see Table 3) 
 
(1)  
Generalized EA  
reliance 
(2)  
Specialized EA  
reliance 
(3)  
Reliance difference  
score  
    
  B SE(B) β p B SE(B) β p B SE(B) β p 
NFC .081 .278 .036 
.772 
















Table 3. Self-reported reliance (1) on generalized epistemic authorities, (2) on specialized 
epistemic authorities, and (3) difference score (generalized – specialized), regressed on NFC 
(Study 1); 
*
 denotes p < .05 
 
Discussion 
 In Study 1, the need for closure significantly predicted liking of generalized 
epistemic authorities relative to specialized epistemic authorities, as assessed by an 
implicit attitude measure, the affect misattribution procedure. A parallel result was 
not obtained, however, for an explicit self-report measure of liking. Thus, Hypothesis 
1 – that individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in NFC evaluate generalized 
epistemic authorities more positively relative to specialized epistemic authorities – 
was supported, but only for an implicit measure of liking. 
 NFC’s relation to self-reported reliance on generalized epistemic authorities 
relative to specialized epistemic authorities was also investigated. Contrary to 
Hypothesis 4, which posited that individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in 
NFC would report relying more heavily on generalized epistemic authorities relative 
to specialized epistemic authorities, NFC was inversely related to self-reported 




authorities. Although this relationship was not significant, it was trending. Moreover, 
NFC did significantly and positively predict reported reliance on specialized 
epistemic authorities, when examined independently of reported reliance on 




Chapter 7: Study 2a 
Whereas Study 1 explored the relationship between epistemic authority 
preferences and the need for closure as a trait variable, Study 2a was designed to test 
Hypothesis 2, that individuals in whom NFC is situationally heightened (vs. lowered) 




One hundred and four students (79 women, 25 men) enrolled in an 
undergraduate psychology course at the University of Maryland completed the study 
in exchange for course credit. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 29, with an 
average age of 19.14 (SD = 1.54). The majority of participants (53.8%) were Non-
Hispanic White; other races/ethnicities represented in the sample were Asian (19.2%), 
Black/African-American (13.5%), Hispanic White (12.5%), Pacific Islander (1.9%), 
and Native American (1.0%). There were no significant interactive effects between 
epistemic authority type (generalized, specialized) and age, gender, or race on the 
dependent variable of interest, epistemic authority evaluation (i.e., liking). 
Design  
Study 2a employed a 2 (NFC: low, high) X 2 (epistemic authority type: 
generalized, specialized) mixed-factorial design, with NFC serving as the between-





Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed the study individually in a lab setting. The entire study 
procedure was computerized. First, NFC was manipulated via a variant of Avnet and 
Higgins’ (2003) behavior recall paradigm developed and employed by Orehek 
(2009), which asked participants to recall and write briefly about three times they 
behaved in a manner consistent with either a high NFC (n = 52) or low NFC (n = 52) 
mindset. The writing prompts used (see Appendix D) were modified versions of items 
taken from the Kruglanski and Webster (1994) NFC scale.  
Next, participants were provided with short descriptions
3
 of two fictional 
epistemic authorities, one generalized and one specialized: 
Generalized epistemic authority description: “[John/Robert] is quite 
knowledgeable about many different subjects. His friends often turn to him for 
knowledge relating to politics, art, music, books, and pop culture.” 
Specialized epistemic authority description: “[John/Robert] is quite 
knowledgeable about politics and current affairs. His friends often turn to him 
for knowledge in this domain.” 
Participants then rated their liking of each fictional epistemic authority, in the 
order in which information about each was presented, on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = 
Not at all, 6 = Very much). Finally, demographic information (age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, and class standing) was collected and a funneled debriefing (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000) was administered, marking the end of the study. 
                                                 
3
 The names (John/Robert) used in each epistemic authority description were randomly 







No participants guessed the study's hypothesis. 
Liking of Epistemic Authorities 
A mixed-factorial ANOVA, in which NFC (low, high) served as the between-
participants factor and epistemic authority type (generalized, specialized) served as 
the within-participants factor, was conducted. There was no significant interaction 
between NFC and epistemic authority type, F(1,102) = 0.71, p > .05. There was also 
no main effect of NFC, F(1,102) = 0.81, p > .05.  There was, however, a significant 
main effect of epistemic authority type, F(1,102) = 37.13, p < .05, with participants 
reporting greater liking for the generalized epistemic authority (M = 4.88, SD = .97) 
than the specialized epistemic authority (M = 4.26, SD = 1.15).  
Discussion 
Due to the nonsignificant interaction between the need for closure and 
epistemic authority type, the results of Study 2a failed to provide support for 
Hypothesis 2, that individuals in whom the need for closure is situationally 
heightened (vs. lowered) evaluate generalized epistemic authorities more positively 
relative to specialized epistemic authorities. In order to rule out the possibility that the 
participants, all of whom were college students, found the specialized epistemic 
authority’s domain of expertise (politics and current affairs) irrelevant and thus did 
not truly regard him as an epistemic authority, a replication of Study 2a was carried 
out – Study 2b – that ascribed a different and perhaps more relevant domain of 




Chapter 8: Study 2b 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-five students (62 women, 23 men) enrolled in an undergraduate 
psychology course at the University of Maryland completed the study in exchange for 
course credit. Of these, two participants failed to follow instructions for the NFC 
manipulation (e.g., wrote "Google" or "ok") in response to the low/high NFC prompts 
and were therefore excluded from further analysis. The remaining eighty-three 
participants (60 women, 23 men) ranged in age from 18 to 31, with an average age of 
19.45 (SD = 1.90). A slight majority of participants (56.6%) were Non-Hispanic 
White; other races/ethnicities represented in the sample were Asian (22.9%), 
Black/African-American (14.5%), Hispanic White (10.8%), Pacific Islander (1.2%), 
and Native American (1.2%). There were no significant interactive effects between 
epistemic authority type (generalized, specialized) and age, gender, or race on the 
dependent variable of interest, epistemic authority evaluation (i.e., liking). 
Design 
Like Study 2a, Study 2b employed a 2 (NFC: low, high) X 2 (epistemic 
authority type: generalized, specialized) mixed-factorial design, with NFC serving as 
the between-participants factor and epistemic authority type serving as the within-
participants factor. 
Materials and Procedure 
The procedure of Study 2b mirrored that of Study 2a, except that (1) 




the specialized epistemic authority was particularly knowledgeable was music, rather 
than politics/current affairs, and (3) a funneled debriefing was not administered due to 
the online nature of the study. 
Results 
Liking of Epistemic Authorities 
The data were analyzed via a mixed-factorial ANOVA, with NFC (low, high) 
serving as the between-participants factor and epistemic authority type (generalized, 
specialized) serving as the within-participants factor. The interaction between NFC 
and epistemic authority type was not significant, F(1,81) = 0.05, p > .05. There were 
also no significant main effects of NFC, F(1,81) = 1.06, p > .05, or epistemic 
authority type, F(1,81) = 0.34, p > .05. 
Discussion 
The null result obtained in Study 2a – i.e., the nonsignificant interactive effect 
of NFC and epistemic authority type on liking – was again obtained in Study 2b, 
suggesting that it was not merely the area of expertise (politics/current affairs) 
ascribed to the specialized epistemic authority that accounted for the initial failure to 
find a statistically significant effect in support of Hypothesis 2. Although it is possible 
that the behavioral recall task used in both Studies 2a and 2b failed to have the 
desired impact on participants’ level of NFC, this seems an implausible explanation 
given the manipulation’s successful employment not only in previous research (e.g., 





Therefore, I believe the failures of Studies 2a and 2b are attributable to a 
different “fatal” design flaw, one that hits upon the very core of what it means to be, 
or not be, an epistemic authority. As previously discussed at some length, the 
ascription of epistemic authority is inherently idiosyncratic, with any source able to 
be elevated to the status of epistemic authority simply by an individual viewing it as 
such. Thus, it is not the characteristics – e.g., expertise, or lack thereof, in pertinent 
knowledge domains – of any particular source that “makes” it an epistemic authority 
but rather its adoption by the individual. This adoption criterion is a defining 
characteristic of epistemic authorities and potentially central to explaining the failures 
of Studies 2a and 2b.  
In order for a source to be viewed as an epistemic authority, an individual 
must see the source not only as one it would want to consult for knowledge, but also 
as one that it could. However, it is unclear how participants in Studies 2a and 2b 
could have truly viewed (i.e., adopted) the fictional “epistemic authorities” they were 
provided descriptions of as epistemic authorities. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising 
that no interactive effect of NFC and epistemic authority type on liking emerged. A 
better test of Hypothesis 2, by proxy of Hypothesis 6, was achieved with Study 4, 




Chapter 9: Study 3 
 Study 3 was designed to test both Hypothesis 5, that individuals in whom the 
need for closure is situationally heightened (vs. lowered) will report a greater 
readiness to rely on more generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities, and 
Hypothesis 7, that individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in NFC will have 
smaller epistemic authority sets. In addition, because a measure of NFC was included 
for the purpose of testing Hypothesis 7, Study 3 also provided a second opportunity to 
test Hypothesis 4, that individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in NFC will 
report relying more heavily on generalized epistemic authorities relative to 
specialized epistemic authorities. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-one students (72 women, 19 men) enrolled in an undergraduate 
psychology course at the University of Maryland completed the study in exchange for 
course credit. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 27, with an average age of 19.48 
(SD = 1.39). The majority of participants (62.6%) were Non-Hispanic White; other 
races/ethnicities represented in the sample were Asian (22.0%), Black/African-
American (9.9%), Hispanic (9.9%), Pacific Islander (1.1%), and Native American 
(1.1%). There were no main effects of gender, age, or race/ethnicity on either 
dependent variable of interest (epistemic authority set size, reliance on 
generalized/specialized epistemic authorities). There was, however, an unanticipated 
significant interaction between age (centered) and gender (effects coded) that 




theoretical interest, for statistical purposes it was controlled for in subsequent 
analyses. There were no other interactive effects among the demographic variables. 
Design 
Study 3 employed both a two-level (NFC: low, high) one-way between-
participants design and a correlational design, in order to test Hypotheses 5 and 7, 
respectively. 
Materials and Procedure 
The study procedure consisted of two parts, the first of which was 
administered as a web-based survey. Data collected from this survey was used both to 
test Hypothesis 7 and to develop participant-specific materials for Part 2, which took 
place in the lab and served to test Hypothesis 5. 
In Part 1, participants completed the Roets and van Hiel (2007) NFC scale (α 
= .90; see Appendix A) and were then instructed (see Appendix E) to free-list sources 
they personally considered to be epistemic authorities. After being provided with 
definitions of generalized and specialized epistemic authorities (see Appendix F), 
participants were asked to rate the generalization/specialization of each of their 
epistemic authorities on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Highly specialized, 6 = Highly 
generalized). Finally, any guesses participants had about the hypothesis/es of the 
study were solicited and demographic information (age, gender, and race/ethnicity) 
was collected. 
Participants who completed Part 1 were invited to participate in Part 2 of the 
study, which took place in a lab setting. In Part 2, NFC was manipulated via the same 




participants randomly assigned to either the high NFC condition or low NFC 
condition. Following this experimental manipulation, participants were provided with 
a list of 10 hypothetical decisions (e.g., “What to major in”; see Appendix G) to make 
across various life domains relevant to college students, given the list of epistemic 
authorities they generated in Part 1, and asked to indicate, by checking off, which of 
their sources they would likely consult for each decision. All participants were then 




No participants guessed either hypothesis.  
Check of Epistemic Authorities 
The epistemic authorities participants provided were examined. Twenty-three 
participants who failed to provide specific epistemic authorities (e.g., “professors,” 
“internet”) as instructed and/or listed “Google” were excluded from further analyses. 
These participants did not significantly differ from the retained participants with 
respect to gender, 
2
(1, N = 91) = .01, p > .05, age, t(89) = 1.38, p > .05, or NFC, 
t(89) = -1.41, p > .05. 
Epistemic Authority Set Size 
In order to test Hypothesis 7, that NFC is inversely related to epistemic 
authority set size, the number of epistemic authorities participants provided in Part 1 
was regressed on participants’ measured NFC, controlling for age (centered), gender 




significant negative predictor of epistemic authority set size, β = -.19, t(63) = -1.67, p 
< .10. 
Anticipated reliance on generalized epistemic authorities 
For two of the ten hypothetical decisions participants were presented with in 
Part 2, at least 20% of participants indicated they would consult none of their 
epistemic authorities. These apparent “bad” items were excluded from further 
analyses (see Appendix G).  
In order to test the hypothesis that individuals in whom NFC is situationally 
heightened (vs. lowered) will report a greater readiness to rely on more generalized 
(vs. specialized) epistemic authorities (Hypothesis 5), the mean generalization ratings 
of the epistemic authorities participants checked off for each hypothetical decision 
were averaged across the eight retained decisions. The mean difference between the 
high (n = 34) and low (n = 30) NFC experimental conditions was tested via an 
independent samples t-test. The degree of generalization of the epistemic authorities 
participants indicated they would consult (i.e., rely upon) for guidance did not 
significantly differ between the low NFC condition (M = 4.37, SD = 0.95) and high 
NFC condition (M = 4.29, SD = 1.13), t(62) = 0.74, p > .05. However, in a simple 
linear regression analysis, measured NFC (from Part 1) significantly and negatively 
predicted the average generalization of participants’ selected epistemic authorities, β 
= -.30, t(62) = -2.43, p < .05. Controlling for experimental condition (low NFC, high 
NFC) via a multiple regression analysis did not appreciably change this result, with 
measured NFC remaining a significant negative predictor of reliance on generalized 
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NFC (condition) -.141 .251 -.069 .578 










Table 4. Reliance on generalized epistemic authorities regressed on (1) measured NFC alone, 
and (2) measured NFC, controlling for NFC condition (Study 3);
 *
 denotes p < .05 
 
Exploratory analyses 
A number of exploratory analyses were carried out via simple linear 
regressions. Participants’ measured NFC did not significantly predict the mean 
number of epistemic authorities consulted across decisions, β = -.03, t(66) = -0.23, p 
> .05, nor did it predict the mean proportion of a participant’s epistemic authority set 
consulted across decisions, β = .17, t(66) = 1.41, p > .05. Similarly, the experimental 
conditions (low NFC, high NFC) did not significantly differ on the average number of 
epistemic authorities consulted across decisions, t(66) = -0.38, p > .05, or on the 
average proportion of participants’ epistemic authority set consulted across decisions, 
t(66) = -0.89, p > .05. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 3 lend additional support to Hypothesis 7. As predicted, 
and mirroring the findings of Pilot Study B, the need for closure was (marginally) 




participants’ measured NFC significantly predicted their reliance on generalized 
epistemic authorities relative to specialized epistemic authorities, although in the 
opposite direction predicted by Hypothesis 4.  
This latter finding is unexpected, but consistent with the results of Study 1, 
and also those of my to-be-discussed Study 4. Moreover, it might explain why, like in 
Pilot Study B, the correlation between epistemic authority set size and NFC reached 
only marginal significance. More specifically, if high NFC individuals prefer 
specialized epistemic authorities to a greater extent than hypothesized, this should 
necessitate the adoption of a greater number of epistemic authorities, which should, in 
turn, serve to dampen any reduction in epistemic authority set size that might 
otherwise arise due to the tendency to attenuate information searches characteristic of 
high NFC individuals, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
(i)  
Epistemic authority set of 
individual with tendencies 
toward attenuated 
information search (high 
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Epistemic authority set of 
individual without tendency 
toward attenuated 
information search (low 
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(A…E = epistemic authorities; D1…D3 = knowledge domains) 
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Figure 1. Illustrative example of proposed joint effect of tendencies toward attenuated 
information searches and preference for generalized versus specialized epistemic authorities 
on epistemic authority set size, compared to a (low NFC) individual without tendency toward 




Chapter 10: Study 4 
Central to the theory I have proposed here linking the need for closure to 
epistemic authority preferences concerning generalization/specialization, is the 
conceptualization of generalized epistemic authorities as multifinal means. Because 
of this, any research program investigating the merit of this theory should address the 
presumed multifinality mechanism upon which Hypotheses 1 through 5 rest. As the 
best way to directly test the operation of this multifinality mechanism is through 
experimental manipulation, Study 4 was designed to test Hypothesis 6, which posited 
that individuals in whom NFC is situationally heightened (vs. lowered) will report 
greater liking of and reliance on epistemic authorities when a multifinal (vs. unifinal) 
view of them is induced. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-six paid participants (64 women, 62 men) completed 
the study, which was administered online through Amazon's Mechanical Turk 
service. Both a comprehension check (see Appendix H) and an attention check (see 
Appendix I) were embedded in the survey. Forty-one participants were excluded from 
further analyses for failing at least one of these. This left a final sample of eighty-five 
participants (48 women, 37 men), who ranged in age from 20 to 74, with an average 
age of 35.16 (SD = 13.65). A little under half (41.2%) of the participants were 
American, with no other nationality comprising more than 6% of the sample. There 
were no effects of age or gender on either dependent variable of interest (liking of, 




participants significantly differ from non-American participants on either dependent 
variable. There were also no interactive effects of age, gender, or country (US vs. all 
other countries) on either dependent variable. 
Design 
Study 4 employed a 2 (NFC: low, high) X 2 (epistemic authority multifinality: 
unifinal, multifinal) between-participants experimental design. Participants were 
randomly distributed among the four resulting experimental conditions. 
Materials and Procedure 
All participants completed the study online. First, NFC was manipulated via 
the same behavior recall task (see Appendix D) used in Studies 2a,b and 3, with 
participants asked to recall and write about times they behaved in a manner consistent 
with either a low NFC mindset (n = 42) or a high NFC mindset (n = 43). Participants 
were then provided with a definition of “epistemic authority” and asked to list a 
person in their lives whom they felt fit this definition. This was immediately followed 
by a comprehension check, which asked participants to, based on the definition they 
were previously provided, "describe briefly what an epistemic authority is" (see 
Appendix H). Next, the multifinality of the epistemic authority participants provided 
was manipulated by having participants list either one knowledge domain (unifinal 
manipulation, n = 39) or three knowledge domains (multifinal manipulation, n = 46) 
they turn to their epistemic authority for guidance in. Each participant was then asked 
to rate, on 7-point Likert scales (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much), the extent to which he 
or she (1) liked and (2) relied on the epistemic authority. Finally, participants 




were solicited, and demographic (age, gender, and nationality) information was 
collected, marking the end of the study. 
Results 
Suspicion Check 
No participants guessed the study’s hypothesis.  
Excluded Participants 
Seven participants failed to pass the comprehension check by providing a 
satisfactory definition of “epistemic authority.” Examples of answers deemed 
inadequate are "motor man," "super natural," and "it is no other than the famous 
google.com website.. who has answers for every question." The participants who 
failed the comprehension check did not significantly differ from the one hundred and 
nineteen participants who passed it in age (MFailed = 28.43 (SD = 6.92), MPassed = 33.49 
(SD = 12.79), t(124) = -1.04, p > .05), nationality (χ
2
(1, N = 126) = 1.48, p > .05), 
self-reported epistemic authority liking (MFailed = 6.57 (SD = 0.53), MPassed = 6.71 (SD 
= 0.61), t(124) = -0.60, p > .05), or self-reported epistemic authority reliance (MFailed 
= 6.14 (SD = 0.90), MPassed = 5.71 (SD = 1.06), t(124) = 1.05, p > .05). The gender 
composition of the two groups did significantly differ, however, with men comprising 
85.7% of the participants who failed the comprehension check but only 49.2% of the 
entire sample, χ
2
(1, N = 126) = 3.95, p < .05. 
Thirty-eight participants failed the attention check embedded in the survey. 
These participants did not significantly differ from the eighty-eight participants who 
passed it in gender (χ
2
(1, N = 126) = 1.64, p > .05), nationality (χ
2
(1, N = 126) = 3.43, 




6.69 (SD = 0.65), t(124) = 0.37, p > .05), or self-reported epistemic authority reliance 
(MFailed = 5.74 (SD = 1.00), MPassed = 5.74 (SD = 1.08), t(124) = -0.01, p > .05). 
Participants who failed the attention check were, however, significantly younger than 
participants who passed it, MFailed = 28.82 (SD = 8.94) and MPassed = 35.10 (SD = 
13.46), t(102.94) = -3.08, p < .05. 
Altogether, forty-one participants were excluded from further analysis for 
failing the comprehension check (n = 7), the attention check (n = 38), or both (n = 4). 
Self-Reported Liking of Epistemic Authority 
A two-way ANOVA (see Table 5) revealed no significant interaction between 
NFC (low, high) and epistemic authority multifinality (unifinal, multifinal) on liking, 
F(1,81) = 0.002, ηp
2 
< .001, p > .05. There was, however, a significant main effect of 
NFC, with participants (n = 42) in the low NFC conditions reporting greater liking (M 
= 6.83, SD = 0.44) of their epistemic authority than participants (n = 43) in the high 
NFC conditions (M = 6.53, SD = 0.80), F(1,81) = 4.12, ηp
2 
= .05, p < .05. There was 
not a significant main effect of multifinality on liking, F(1,81) = 0.93, ηp
2 
= .01, p > 
.05.  
 
Table 5. Multifinality manipulation X NFC manipulation ANOVA for epistemic authority 
liking (Study 4); 
* 
denotes p < .05 
 
  df F ηp
2 
 p 
Multifinality 1 .933 .011 .337 
NFC 1 4.120
*
 .048 .046 
Multifinality X NFC 1 .000 .000 .967 





















Figure 2. Mean epistemic authority liking by experimental condition (Study 4). 
 
Self-reported reliance on epistemic authority 
A two-way ANOVA (see Table 6) revealed a significant interaction between 
NFC (low, high) and epistemic authority multifinality (unifinal, multifinal) on 
reliance, F(1,81) = 6.93, ηp
2 
< .08, p < .05. There was also a significant main effect of 
multifinality, with participants (n = 39) in the unifinal conditions (M = 6.08, SD = 
0.93), reporting greater reliance on their epistemic authority than participants (n = 46) 
in the multifinal conditions (M = 5.41, SD = 1.11), F(1,81) = 9.42, ηp
2 
= .104, p < .05. 
There was not a significant main effect of NFC on reliance, F(1,81) = 0.24, ηp
2 
= 






Table 6. Multifinality manipulation X NFC manipulation ANOVA for epistemic authority 
reliance (Study 4); 
* 
denotes p < .05 
A probe of the interaction between NFC and multifinality revealed two 
significant simple effects (see Figure 3). Among participants whose epistemic 

























Figure 3. Mean epistemic authority reliance by experimental condition (Study 4). 
 





 .104 .003 
NFC 1 .244 .003 .622 
Multifinality X NFC 1 6.929
*
 .079 .010 
Error 81    
 





greater reliance (M = 6.44, SD = 0.71) on their epistemic authorities than participants 
(n = 21) in the low NFC condition (M = 5.76, SD = 1.10), t(81) = 2.13, p < .05. And, 
among participants in whom a high NFC was induced, those whose epistemic 
authorities were framed as unifinal (n = 18) reported greater reliance (M = 6.44, SD = 
0.71) on their epistemic authorities than participants (n = 25) whose epistemic 
authorities were framed as multifinal (M = 5.20, SD = 1.19), t(81) = -4.03, p < .05. 
Discussion 
The interactive effect of the need for closure (low, high) and multifinality 
framing (unifinal, multifinal) on epistemic authority reliance provides strong evidence 
in support of means multifinality as the linking mechanism between NFC and reliance 
on generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities. Although the pattern of the 
interaction was not as I had hypothesized – with simple effects analyses revealing that 
(1) participants in the high NFC conditions reported greater reliance when a unifinal 
(i.e., specialized) view of their epistemic authority was induced as compared to when 
a multifinal (i.e., generalized) view of their epistemic authority was induced, and (2) 
among participants receiving the unifinal epistemic authority framing, those in whom 
a high NFC was induced reported greater reliance on their epistemic authorities – 
these findings are nonetheless consistent with those of Studies 1 and 3.  
Moreover, the failure to find an interactive effect of NFC and multifinality 
framing on liking is also consistent with the null result of Study 1 with respect to the 
relationship between NFC and an explicit, self-report measure of liking). Although 
there was no interaction between NFC and multifinality framing with respect to 




liking. More specifically, inducing a high NFC mindset appeared to lead to an across-
the-board decrease in participants’ liking of their epistemic authorities, perhaps 
because asking participants to think about sources they turn to for information primed 




Chapter 11: General Discussion and Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
The findings of these studies offer mixed implications for my original 
theoretical framework. Whereas some results provide support for my theory, other 
results refute it. 
As predicted, participants dispositionally higher in the need for closure did 
implicitly evaluate generalized epistemic authorities more positively relative to 
specialized epistemic authorities (as assessed via the AMP, Study 1). However a 
similar result was not obtained with explicit, self-report measures of liking (Studies 1, 
2a,b, and 4). Moreover, results inconsistent with my predictions were observed with 
respect to the need for closure’s relation to reliance on generalized (vs. specialized) 
epistemic authorities, as individuals higher (both dispositionally and situationally) in 
the need for closure exhibited/reported greater reliance on specialized (vs. 
generalized) epistemic authorities (Studies 1, 3, and 4). Experimental evidence from 
Study 4 suggests that the means multifinality mechanism proposed to link the need 
for closure and preferences regarding generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic 
authorities is, in fact, in play, at least with respect to epistemic authority reliance; 
however, it appears to be operating in a fashion opposite to that predicted by my 
original theory. Lastly, and as predicted, the need for closure was inversely associated 
with epistemic authority set size (Study 3 and Pilot Study B), although only 
marginally so. 
In light of these results, it is clear that the original theory I proposed is 




intriguing present set of results must account for two things: (1) the findings of 
Studies 1, 3, and 4, which evinced a negative – not positive, as was predicted – 
relationship between the need for closure and reliance on generalized (vs. specialized) 
epistemic authorities, and (2) the incongruent findings for reliance and liking, two 
variables I assumed would have similar manifestations as reflections of a single latent 
“preference” variable. In what follows I present a revised theoretical synthesis aimed 
at accomplishing this.  
A Revised Theoretical Synthesis 
Recall there are two tendencies that accompany a heightened need for closure: 
urgency, or the desire to achieve closure quickly, and permanence, or the desire to 
retain closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Also recall that the “cost” of the 
multifinality of a means is a reduction in, or “dilution” of, the perceived 
instrumentality of that means to any given goal (Zhang et al., 2007). The central 
argument of my revised theory is that whereas the permanence-affording quality of a 
multifinal means (e.g., a generalized epistemic authority) may make it inherently 
attractive to high need for closure individuals, urgency concerns may outweigh 
permanence considerations when a means’ capacity for effecting closure is called into 
question due to the dilution of its perceived instrumentality. Next I will discuss how 
this theoretical treatment addresses both: (1) the inverse relationship observed 
between the need for closure and reliance on generalized epistemic authorities, and 
(2) the dissociation of liking of and reliance on generalized epistemic authorities.  
The clearest shortfall of my original theory is that the relationship between the 




borne out by the data was precisely the opposite of what I predicted, with individuals 
higher (vs. lower) in the need for closure relying less, not more, on generalized 
epistemic authorities relative to specialized epistemic authorities. That this result was 
obtained across multiple studies that (a) operationalized the need for closure as both a 
trait and state variable (Studies 1 and 3, and Study 4, respectively) and (b) measured 
reliance in divergent ways, is difficult to ignore. Therefore, the first hurdle my revised 
theory must clear is this: Why might individuals higher (vs. lower) in the need for 
closure rely less heavily on generalized epistemic authorities (relative to specialized 
epistemic authorities), which, as Study 4 demonstrated, can be reasonably 
conceptualized as multifinal means to knowledge? 
As previously alluded to, the answer may lie with the relationship between the 
need for closure and the multifinality preference, itself. If you will recall, originally I 
asserted (as did Chun and Kruglanski, 2005) that multifinal means should be 
preferred by individuals high in the need for closure because such means (a) afford 
cross-situational consistency, in service of the permanence tendency associated with 
the need for closure, and (b) allow for the pursuit of (closure on) multiple goals 
simultaneously. However, it is possible that this proposition gives too short of shrift 
to the urgency tendency that also accompanies a heightened need for closure.  
That is, multifinal means only allow for closure on multiple goals to the extent 
they successfully serve, or fulfill, those goals; and multifinality’s “cost” is diminished 
perceived instrumentality of the means and, with it, decreased expectancy of goal 
attainment (Zhang et al., 2007). High need for closure individuals may be attracted to 




reduction in perceived instrumentality that accompanies multifinality – which speaks 
to a means’ capacity (or lack thereof) for satisfying the urgency tendency – presents a 
problem for individuals high in the need for closure. Namely, if a high need for 
closure individual employs a multifinal means he views as not very effective for goal 
pursuit, he will likely anticipate needing to try a number of such means before 
satisfactorily reaching closure on any one of his goals. This “trial and error” process 
might ultimately afford permanent closure, but without satisfying the desire for 
urgency. By contrast, unifinal means have lower value (due to lesser permanence) but 
greater perceived instrumentality, meaning successful goal attainment may be 
possible via a “one shot” employment of such a means (e.g., a specialized epistemic 
authority). 
Thus, urgency concerns may factor into the means preferences of high need 
for closure individuals in a more complicated fashion than previously assumed. If the 
perceived instrumentality of a generalized epistemic authority is reduced to the point 
where a high need for closure individual views it as incapable (or, at least, likely 
incapable) of effecting epistemic closure, this source might be passed over in favor of 
a more specialized epistemic authority. Such a strategy is compatible with the 
urgency principle, and also the inverse relation between the need for closure and 
reliance on generalized epistemic authorities relative to specialized epistemic 
authorities observed in the present set of studies.  
If the urgency and permanence principles sometimes operate at cross-purposes 
to one another in determining multifinal means judgments and evaluations, this may 




results obtained for reliance and those obtained for liking. An implicit assumption of 
my original theory was that “preference for” epistemic authorities of a certain ilk 
would manifest in both (a) greater liking for and (b) greater reliance on these 
epistemic authorities. Yet, across multiple studies, need for closure’s relationship to 
liking was out of sync with its relationship to reliance. Whereas a consistent pattern 
emerged in that individuals high in the need for closure exhibited and reported a 
tendency to rely less heavily on generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities, a 
parallel pattern was not observed with respect to liking of generalized (vs. 
specialized) epistemic authorities. Instead, three studies failed to establish the 
presence of any relationship between the need for closure and explicit liking of 
generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities. Moreover, the one study in which 
an implicit measure of liking was used (Study 1) revealed a relationship between the 
need for closure and liking that, although congruent with my original theory, is 
precisely opposite that observed for the need for closure and reliance. Specifically, 
individuals higher (vs. lower) in the need for closure implicitly evaluated generalized 
epistemic authorities more positively relative to specialized epistemic authorities.  
The above findings suggest that, with respect to judgments of epistemic 
authority, not only are reliance and liking dissociable from one another as 
manifestations of “preference” but they appear to, at times, operate counter to each 
another. That is, individuals higher (vs. lower) in the need for closure may have a 
tendency to evaluate generalized epistemic authorities more positively relative to 
specialized epistemic authorities (at least implicitly), yet, when faced with making a 




Such an outcome is compatible with the notion of the permanence and 
urgency tendencies associated with the need for closure, at times, simultaneously 
increasing and decreasing, respectively, the attractiveness of multifinal means (e.g., 
generalized epistemic authorities). With respect to reliance, expectancy concerns may 
often “win the day.” Liking, on the other hand, is more closely linked to value 
judgments, which may explain why individuals high in the need for closure appear to 
implicitly like generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities more than their low 
need for closure counterparts. Explicit, deliberative judgments of liking may, 
however, be more susceptible to the influence of expectancy perceptions, which may 
counteract, or “wash out,” the implicit liking effect and explain the lack of any 
observed systematic relationship between the need for closure and explicit liking of 
generalized (vs. specialized) epistemic authorities. 
Future Directions 
The work presented here is a first step in the investigation of the need for 
closure’s relation to epistemic authority preferences. One question future research 
could pursue is why the observed relationship between the need for closure and 
epistemic authority preferences does not neatly align with previous empirical 
investigations of the need for closure and preferences regarding multifinal means. 
Recall the original formulation of my theoretical framework drew heavily from 
previous research (Chun & Kruglanski, 2005a; Sleeth-Keppler, 2004) showing that 
individuals high in the need for closure appear to prefer multifinal (vs. unifinal) 
means to a greater extent than their low need for closure counterparts. Although the 




for closure’s relation to multifinality preferences, closer inspection of the methods 
and operationalizations of “preference” employed by Sleeth-Keppler (2004) and 
Chun and Kruglanski (2005a) reveals this work may not truly be odds with the 
findings presented here, or the more nuanced revised theory I have proposed.  
Sleeth-Keppler (2004) found individuals high in the need for closure endorsed 
a multifinal definition of friendship (i.e., friends as people “involved in many 
aspects” of their lives and who “make possible or facilitate many of their current 
activities, interests, and needs”) over a unifinal definition of friendship (i.e., friends as 
people “involved in few or only one aspect” of their lives) to a greater extent than 
their low need for closure counterparts. This finding is not incompatible with the 
revised theoretical framework I have presented, which posits the permanence-
affording quality of multifinal means should make them inherently attractive to high 
NFC individuals, even if instrumentality concerns often “win the day” when it comes 
time to select, or rely upon, a means. In other words, the operational definition of 
“preference” in Sleeth-Keppler’s study – evaluations of abstract notions of multifinal 
versus unifinal friends and not evaluations of, or reliance on, specific multifinal or 
unifinal friends – seems ideal for capturing the influence of the permanence tendency, 
but not the instrumentality-associated influence of the urgency tendency, on the 
evaluation of multifinal means. Paralleling this, I would expect individuals high in the 
need for closure to endorse a multifinal (i.e., generalized) definition of epistemic 
authorities over a unifinal (i.e., specialized) one to a greater extent than individuals 




A similar account may also explain the result of Chun and Kruglanski’s 
(2005a) Study 1, in which individuals dispositionally high in the need for closure 
endorsed the “pro-multifinality” proverb of “killing two birds with one stone” over 
the “uni-finality” proverb “if you run after two hares, you will catch neither” to a 
greater extent than individuals low in the need for closure. As in Sleeth-Keppler’s 
(2004) study, preference (liking) for multifinal means was assessed at a level of 
abstraction at which instrumentality-related urgency concerns may have been 
rendered irrelevant.  
The explanation offered above does not, however, speak to the remainder of 
Chun and Kruglanski’s findings. Across their four other studies, a preference for 
multifinal means manifested in individuals dispositionally high (vs. low) in the need 
for closure, such that they: (1) reported more multifinal use of computers (Study 2); 
(2) more readily sacrificed goal quality for the sake of goal quantity when selecting a 
camera (Study 3); (3) were willing to pay a higher price for their multifinality pursuit 
(Study 4); and (4) were more likely to choose a multifinal means (soap) over multiple 
unifinal means (soap and facial cleanser) that, together, served the same goals 
(washing one’s face and body) as the multifinal means (Study 5).  
Recall that my revised theory posits high need for closure individuals may 
prioritize instrumentality-related urgency concerns (and, thus, unifinal means) over 
permanence concerns (and multifinal means) when the perceived instrumentality of a 
means is reduced to the point where it no longer is viewed as likely to successfully 
effect goal attainment and, therefore, closure. It may be the case that, in these four 




means never crossed this threshold. If participants still felt their selection (Studies, 3, 
4, and 5), or use (Study 2) of the multifinal means would afford closure, there would 
be no cause for urgency concerns to work counter to, let alone trump, ones of 
permanence.  
The specifics of Chun and Kruglanski’s studies provide some support for this 
possibility. For example, in their Study 3, a unifunctional (i.e., unifinal) camera of 
“very good quality” was pitted against a multifunctional (i.e., multifinal) camera of 
“good quality.” It seems improbable that the decrease in the quality of the goal 
pursuit from “very good” to “good” meaningfully undermined participants’ 
confidence in the camera’s ability to satisfactorily accomplish the goal at hand. That 
is, participants likely did not anticipate that the multifunctional camera might do so 
poorly of a job they would be forced to seek out a different camera altogether, a 
process that would prolong closure and presumably be particularly aversive to high 
need for closure individuals. Similarly, in Chun and Kruglanski’s Study 4, both the 
multifunctional and unifunctional cell phones were described as having “very high” 
reception rates, introducing the possibility that any difference in the perceived 
instrumentality of the two cell phones was insufficient to create appreciable 
uncertainty about the multifinal means’ (i.e., the multifunctional cell phone’s) 
capacity for effecting closure.  
In sum, it seems plausible that the multifinality manipulations employed in 
Chun and Kruglanski’s studies did not engender conflict between urgency and 
permanence concerns, which, according to my revised theory, is crucial to multifinal 




epistemic or otherwise – affords closure only if it sufficiently fulfills the goal(s) it 
serves. Given this, a means that accomplishes a goal in a suboptimal way – yet 
nevertheless effects closure – is quite different from a means that does not accomplish 
the goal at all and leaves one wanting for closure, anathema to high need for closure 
individuals. Although individuals high in the need for closure may be willing to 
sacrifice means instrumentality and quality of goal attainment to a point, even high 
need for closure individuals should be averse to multifinal means once the perceived 
instrumentality of such means drop below a certain threshold. It may be the case that 
this uncertainty-instrumentality threshold was not crossed in Chun and Kruglanski’s 
studies. 
Although, taken together, the findings of the present research and those of 
Chun and Kruglanski (2005a) suggest not all multifinal means operate in precisely the 
same way where the need for closure is concerned, I do not believe epistemic 
authorities are simply an exception to the rule. Rather, as I argue in the revised 
theoretical synthesis I have set forth here, there are compelling reasons why high need 
for closure individuals might sometimes choose or rely more heavily on unifinal 
means. Future goal systemic research could profitably systematically test the 
conditions under which high need for closure individuals do and do not “prefer” 
multifinal means. 
Future research should also strive to identify the reason for the apparent 
discrepancy between the findings of Studies 1, 3, and 4, and those of Pilot Study A. It 
is not immediately clear why Pilot Study A obtained results in support of my original 




refuted it. It is worth noting, however, that the hypothesis tested in Pilot Study A – 
that individuals dispositionally higher (vs. lower) in the need for closure have 
epistemic authority sets consisting of more generalized epistemic authorities – was 
not one directly tested by Studies 1, 3, and 4, which were instead designed to assess 
liking of and reliance on such epistemic authorities. It is possible, therefore, that these 
findings are not truly discrepant and, rather, are all accounted for under the revised 
theory I have proposed. That is, it may be that individuals higher (vs. lower) in the 
need for closure do have epistemic authority sets that consist of more generalized 
epistemic authorities (perhaps because they implicitly like them more due to their 
permanence affording quality), yet nevertheless tend to rely on their more specialized 
epistemic authorities to a greater extent “when push comes to shove.” This would be 
compatible with the notion of the urgency and permanence tendencies sometimes 
operating at cross-purposes with respect to preferences regarding multifinal (vs. 
unifinal) means. 
Lastly, with the exception of Study 1’s use of the affect misattribution 
procedure, the research presented here relied exclusively on self-report data. Future 
research should employ studies in which both liking of and reliance on epistemic 
authorities are assessed via a variety of behavioral measures. 
Conclusion 
The theoretical and empirical work presented and discussed here sheds light 
upon the association between the need for closure and epistemic authority 
preferences, and also multifinality’s role in this relationship. However, it also raises 




closure’s relation to multifinality preferences is more complex than previously 
assumed, but it does not fully elucidate these intricacies. The value of this research, 
therefore, is closely tied to future research that systematically investigates when, 
during the course of goal pursuit, individuals high in the need for closure do and do 
not prefer (evaluate more positively, rely on more heavily) multifinal means over 





Appendix A: Roets and van Hiel (2007) Need for Closure 
Scale (Pilot A, Studies 1 & 3) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you would agree with 
each according to your attitudes, beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to 
the following scale, using only one number for each statement. 
 
1 = Strongly disagree   4 = Slightly agree 
2 = Moderately disagree   5 = Moderately agree 
3 = Slightly disagree   6 = Strongly agree 
 
1 I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success. 
2 
Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a 
different opinion. 
3 I have never been late for work or for an appointment.† 
4 I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
5 I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
6 I like to have friends who are unpredictable.
*
 
7 I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
8 
When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to 
expect. 
9 
I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my 
life. 
10 I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
11 I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
12 I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
13 When I have made a decision, I feel relieved. 
14 When I am confronted with a problem, I'm dying to reach a solution very quickly. 
15 When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 
16 
I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a 
problem immediately. 
17 I would rather make a decision quickly than sleep over it. 
18 Even if I get a lot of time to make a decision, I still feel compelled to decide quickly. 
19 I have never known someone I did not like.† 











22 My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.
*
 
23 I have never hurt another's feelings.† 
24 In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong. 
25 I almost always feel hurried to reach a decision, even when there is no reason to do so. 
26 
I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important 
characteristics of a good student. 
27 




28 I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
29 I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them. 
30 









32 I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
33 I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
34 It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind. 
35 I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
36 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
37 I prefer to interact with people whose opinions are very different from my own.
*
 
38 I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
39 I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me. 
40 I always see many possible solutions to problems I face.
*
 
41 I believe that one should never engage in leisure activities.† 
42 I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 
43 I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
44 I dislike unpredictable situations. 
45 I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies). 
46 I feel there is no such thing as an honest mistake.† 
*




Appendix B: Short Form of Webster and Kruglanski (1994) 
Need for Closure Scale (Pilot B) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you would agree with 
each according to your attitudes, beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to 
the following scale, using only one number for each statement. 
 
1 = Strongly disagree   4 = Slightly agree 
2 = Moderately disagree   5 = Moderately agree 
3 = Slightly disagree   6 = Strongly agree 
 
1 In case of uncertainty, I prefer to make an immediate decision, whatever it may be. 
2 
When I find myself facing various, potentially valid, alternatives, I decide in favor of 
one of them quickly and without hesitation. 
3 I have never been late for work or for an appointment.† 
4 
I prefer to decide on the first available solution rather than to ponder at length what 
decision I should make. 
5 I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place. 
6 
Generally, I avoid participating in discussions on ambiguous and controversial 
problems. 
7 
When I need to confront a problem, I do not think about it too much and I decide 
without hesitation 
8 
When I need to solve a problem, I generally do not waste time in considering diverse 
points of view about it.  
9 I prefer to be with people who have the same ideas and tastes as myself.  
10 
Generally, I do not search for alternative solutions to problems for which I already 
have a solution available. 
11 
I feel uncomfortable when I do not manage to give a quick response to problems that I 
face. 
12 I have never hurt another person’s feelings.† 
13 Any solution to a problem is better than remaining in a state of uncertainty.  
14 
I prefer activities where it is always clear what is to be done and how it needs to be 
done.  
15 
After having found a solution to a problem I believe that it is a useless waste of time to 
take into account diverse possible solutions.  
16 I prefer things to which I am used to those I do not know, and cannot predict. 




Appendix C: Generalized/Specialized Epistemic Authority 
Definitions (Study 1) 
“We all have sources (e.g., parents, friends, newspapers) we turn to for knowledge 
and guidance in our lives; these sources are called epistemic authorities. Epistemic 
authorities differ in the breadth of their perceived competence and expertise. In other 
words, you probably turn to some epistemic authorities for knowledge and/or 
guidance in many areas of your life and others for knowledge and/or guidance in a 
single or very few area(s) of your life. Sources that you turn to across many areas of 
your life are generalized epistemic authorities, whereas sources you turn to in a very 




















Appendix D: NFC Behavior Recall Manipulation Prompts 
(Studies 2a&b, 3, and 4) 
All participants: "Please think back and recall times…” 
     Low need for closure condition: 
(a) “…when, even after you made up your mind about something, you were 
eager to consider a different opinion.”  
(b) “…thinking about a problem, you considered as many different options on 
the issue as possible.” 
(c) “… you disliked the routine aspects of your work or studies.” 
     High need for closure condition: 
(a) “… you believed that orderliness and organization were among the most 
important characteristics of a good student.”  
(b) “… you quickly became impatient and irritated when you did not find a 
solution to a problem immediately.” 
(c) “… you felt irritated when one person disagreed with what everyone else 






Appendix E: Epistemic Authority Free-Listing Instructions 
(Study 3) 
“Please list the different sources you turn to for guidance/knowledge in your life. 
They can be other people (e.g., a parent, a TV personality) but can also be things such 
as a newspaper. PLEASE BE SPECIFIC. For example, if you turn to peers/friends for 
guidance/knowledge, please list them by name (first name only), instead of simply 



























Appendix F: Generalized/Specialized Epistemic Authority 
Definitions, Rating Instructions (Study 3) 
“A SPECIALIZED epistemic authority is a source that you turn to for knowledge/ 
guidance in a relatively limited area of your life. A GENERALIZED epistemic 
authority is a source that you turn to for knowledge/guidance in many different life 
domains. Please rate the extent to which YOU consider each of the sources you listed 















Appendix G: Decision Task List (Study 3) 
1. What to major in. 
2. Where to live. 
3. Whether to join a fraternity/sorority; which fraternity/sorority to join. 
4. What to do following a big fight with your parents. 
5. Whether to apply to graduate school. 
6. What exercise/diet regimen to adopt. 
7. What job offer to accept after graduation. 
8. Whether or not to ask out someone you’re romantically interested in. 
9. How best to study/prepare for a specific course you hear is difficult.† 
 
10. What candidate to vote for in the 2012 presidential election.† 




















Appendix H: Comprehension Check (Study 4) 
Definition of “epistemic authority” provided to participants:  
“We all have sources (e.g., parents, friends, newspapers) we turn to for 
knowledge and guidance in our lives; these sources are called epistemic 
authorities.” 
Instructions presented on following page (note: participants were unable to go back 
to the previous page with their browser):  
“Based on the definition we provided on the previous page, please describe 


























Appendix I: Attention Check (Study 4) 
“Recent research on decision-making shows that choices are affected by context. 
Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their 
environment can affect choices. To help us understand how people make decisions, 
we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether 
you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, some results may not tell us 
very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you have read the 
instructions, please ignore the question below about how you are feeling and instead 
check only the ‘none of the above’ option as your answer. Thank you very much. 
 
Please check all words that describe how you are currently feeling.” 
 
 Interested  Hostile  Nervous 
 Distressed  Enthusiastic  Determined 
 Excited  Proud  Attentive 
 Upset  Irritable  Jittery 
 Strong  Alert  Active 
 Guilty  Ashamed  Afraid 
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